Showing 1 - 10 of 163
be risk averse, (ii) the bidders can have heterogeneous risk preferences, and (iii) the auction can have a binding … reserve price. Our analysis reveals that the premium has an intricate joint effect on risk sharing and expected revenue, which … in general benefits risk averse bidders. When the seller is more risk averse than the pivotal bidder - a condition often …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010234599
Despite the wide occurrence of ties in a variety of contest settings, the strategic interaction that arises when ties are treated as viable outcomes has received little attention. Building on recent theoretical work, we experimentally examine an extension of the canonical two-player all-pay...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013012900
contest experiments- (i) overbidding relative to the standard Nash equilibrium prediction and (ii) heterogeneous behavior of … ex-ante symmetric contestants. Based on the sample of contest experiments that we review, the median overbidding rate is … 72%. We provide different explanations for the overbidding phenomenon, including bounded rationality, utility of winning …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817423
The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324705
Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, they allow for preemptive bidding by incumbent bidders in a coordinated attempt to exclude entrants from the market. We consider an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325228
Auctions are generally not efficient when the object's expected value depends on private and common value information. We report a series of first-price auction experiments to measure the degree of inefficiency that occurs with financially motivated bidders. While some subjects fall prey to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303292
The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303293
The popularity of open ascending auctions is often attributed to the fact that openly observable bidding allows to aggregate dispersed information. Another reason behind the frequent utilization of open auction formats may be that they activate revenue enhancing biases. In an experiment, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014352203
The popularity of open ascending auctions is often attributed to the fact that openly observable bidding allows to aggregate dispersed information. Another reason behind the frequent utilization of open auction formats may be that they activate revenue enhancing biases. In an experiment, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012427695
Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, they allow for preemptive bidding by incumbent bidders in a coordinated attempt to exclude entrants from the market. We consider an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011342575