We develop a dynamic model for analyzing the programs of contractual savings for housing (CSH). We introduce concepts of stability as well as strong and weak stability of trajectories generated by CSH programs, and obtain the necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee fulfillment of...

The theory of institutional traps, i.e. ineffective but stable institutions or behavior norms, is develope din connection with economic reforms. Mechanisms are described that cause a system to get into a trap and ways of going out of it are analyzed. Concepts of transformation costs and...

One of the main obstacles for successful economic development is the formation of institutional traps, inefficient yet stable norms of behaviour. Domination of barter exchange, arrears, corruption and black market activities are examples of institutional traps that have hampered reforms in...

We propose an evolutionary equation and develop an asymptotic theory that generalize results obtained in Polterovich, Khenkin, 1988. It is shown that, as a result of interaction between innovation and imitation, the shape of the efficiency distribution curve of technologies eventually...

Any legislative framework is likely to generate different institutions or norms of behavior which the legislator occasionally could have never foreseen. I suggested a general pattern, on which inefficient, if stable, norms or institutions called institutional traps would form.

We propose a difference-differential equation that reflects interactions between innovation and imitation processes to describe the evolution of the distribution curve of firms by efficiency levels. An explicit solution of this equation is obtained for arbitrary finite initial conditions. It is...