Showing 1 - 10 of 22
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346883
communicated might matter. In a controlled field experiment, we study a minimally invasive change in the communication of a well …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285314
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011785124
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673357
We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test … sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011214041
We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test … sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011251784
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when the buyer may present evidence relevant to the buyer's value, or when different types of buyer have a differential ability to communicate. We introduce a dynamic bargaining protocol in which the buyer first makes a sequence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009246715
in quantity and quality of output. We use data from a controlled field experiment that changed the communication of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084038
working conditions causes workers to quit at more similar times. When, and only when, communication is allowed, workers are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010899503
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777681