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Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers

Dürsch, Peter; Kolb, Albert; Oechssler, Jörg; … - 2005

number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious … play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those … and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263153

Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers

Dürsch, Peter; Kolb, Albert; Oechssler, Jörg; … - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422135

Unbeatable Imitation

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Jörg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2010

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that are of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422207

Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Jörg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2012

We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422230

Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly

Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2002

We present a formal model of symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of profit optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round a la Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play myopic best response to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276582

Unbeatable imitation

Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Jörg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2010

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule imitate-the-best can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show that it can only be beaten by much in games that are of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282117

Strategic Teaching and Learning in Games

Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2017

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic …" or that could "learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012971885