The evolutionary selection of outcomes (modelled using the replicator dynamics) in games with costless communication depends crucially on the structural assumptions made on the underlying population. (1) In conflicts between two interacting populations, common interest implies that the set of...

In consectutive rounds, each agent in a finite population chooses an action, is randomly matched, obtains a payoff and then observes the performance of another agent. An agent determines future behavior based on the information she receives from the present round. She chooses among the...

Consider a large population of individuals that are repeatedly randomly matched to play a cyclic 2x2 game such as Matching Pennies with fixed roles assigned in the game. Some learn by sampling previous play of a finite number of other individuals in the same role. We analyze population dynamics...

A partnership game is a two person game in which both players necessarily receive the same payoff. For symmetric partnership games it is shown that asymptotic stability with respect to the replicator dynamics, evolutionary stability (Maynard Smith and Price [1973], Thomas [1985]) and equilibrium...