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An examination of the effect of messages on cooperation under double-blind and single-blind payoff procedures
Deck, Cary A.; Servátka, Maroš; Tucker, Steven James - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 16 (2013) 4, pp. 597-607
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010345921
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An examination of the effect of messages on cooperation under double-blind and single-blind payoff procedures
Deck, Cary; Servátka, Maroš; Tucker, Steven - In: Experimental Economics 16 (2013) 4, pp. 597-607
Previous research has suggested that communication and especially promises increase cooperation in laboratory experiments. This has been taken as evidence for internal motivations such as guilt aversion or preference for promise keeping. The goal of this paper was to examine messages under a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988990
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An Examination of the Effect of Messages on Cooperation under Double-Blind and Single-Blind Payoff Procedures
Deck, Cary; Servátka, Maroš; Tucker, Steven - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2012
Previous research has suggested that communication and especially promises in-crease cooperation in laboratory experiments. This has been taken as evidence for internal motivations such as guilt aversion or preference for promise keeping. The goals of this paper are to examine messages under a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010907406
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Comment on "Promises and Partnership"
Deck, Cary; Servátka, Maroš; Tucker, Steven - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2011
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find that promises increase cooperation and suggest that the behavior of subjects in their experiment is driven by guilt aversion. By modifying the procedures to include a double blind social distance protocol we test an alternative explanation that promise keeping...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914311
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Do People Keep Socially Unverifiable Promises?
Deck, Cary; Servátka, Maroš; Tucker, Steven - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2011
Previous research has suggested that communication and especially promises increase cooperation in laboratory experiments. This has been taken as evidence for internal motivations such as guilt aversion or preference for promise keeping. The original goal of this paper was to examine promises...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371391
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The house money effect and negative reciprocity
Danková, Katarína; Servátka, Maroš - In: Journal of economic psychology : research in economic … 48 (2015), pp. 60-71
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011505933
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Nice to you, nicer to me : does self-serving generosity diminish the reciprocal response?
Woods, Daniel; Servátka, Maroš - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 22 (2019) 2, pp. 506-529
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012300003
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The house money effect and negative reciprocity
Danková, Katarína; Servátka, Maroš - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010242804
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The house money effect and negative reciprocity
Danková, Katarína; Servátka, Maroš - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011296503
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The House Money Effect and Negative Reciprocity
Danková, Katarína - 2014
In the vast majority of laboratory experiments documenting the existence of reciprocity subjects are endowed with … reciprocal behavior. In this study we identify two reasons why the source of endowment might matter for negative reciprocity: (1 …) Using earned – as opposed to windfall money – might increase the costs of negative reciprocity due to this money being in a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013059280