"Abstract: Taxation and liability are compared here as means of controlling harmful externalities. It is emphasized … that liability has an advantage over taxation: inefficiency of incentives arises under taxation when, as would be typical … incentives under liability does not require the state to determine expected harm -- it requires only that injurers pay for harm …

In an earlier work, we analyzed how the legal rules governing contractual liability affect the transfer of information … between the parties to the contract. In particular, we showed how limitations on contractual liability might lead high … liability are and are not socially desirable. In an article forthcoming in the Stanford Law Review, Barry Adler develops a …

Taxation and liability are compared here as means of controlling harmful externalities. It is emphasized that liability … liability does not require the state to determine expected harm - it requires only that injurers pay for harm that occurs …. However, taxation enjoys an advantage over liability: incentives under liability are diluted to the degree that injurers might …

In an earlier work, we analyzed how the legal rules governing contractual liability affect the transfer of information … between the parties to the contract. In particular, we showed how limitations on contractual liability might lead high … liability are and are not socially desirable. In an article forthcoming in the Stanford Law Review, Barry Adler develops a …

Taxation and liability are compared here as means of controlling harmful externalities. It is emphasized that liability … liability does not require the state to determine expected harm - it requires only that injurers pay for harm that occurs …. However, taxation enjoys an advantage over liability: incentives under liability are diluted to the degree that injurers might …