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Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 31 (2013) 3, pp. 278-286

Conflict and competition often impose costs on both winners and losers, and conflicting parties may prefer to resolve a dispute before it occurs. The equilibrium of a conflict game with side-payments predicts that with binding offers, proposers make and responders accept side-payments,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010666054

Best-of-three contest experiments: Strategic versus psychological momentum

Mago, Shakun D.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Yates, Andrew - In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 31 (2013) 3, pp. 287-296

We conduct an experimental analysis of a best-of-three Tullock contest. Intermediate prizes lead to higher efforts, while increasing the role of luck (as opposed to effort) leads to lower efforts. Both intermediate prizes and luck reduce the probability of the contest ending in two rounds. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010666057

Transparency, efficiency and the distribution of economic welfare in pass-through investment trust games

Rietz, Thomas A.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy W. - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 94 (2013) C, pp. 257-267

We design an experiment to examine behavior and welfare in a multi-level trust game representing a pass through … investment in an intermediated market. In a repeated game, an investor invests via an intermediary who lends to a borrower. A pre-experiment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719261

When parity promotes peace: Resolving conflict between asymmetric agents

Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy W. - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 99 (2014) C, pp. 96-108

capabilities, conflicts are unavoidable because the stronger agent prefers to fight. The results of the experiment confirm that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048067

Behavioral spillovers in coordination games

Cason, Timothy N.; Savikhin, Anya C.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - In: European Economic Review 56 (2012) 2, pp. 233-245

Motivated by problems of coordination failure observed in weak-link games, we experimentally investigate behavioral spillovers for minimum- and median-effort coordination games. Subjects play these coordination games simultaneously and sequentially. The results show that successful coordination...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573229

Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules

Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Turocy, … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 224-238

We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931195

Commitment problems in conflict resolution

Kimbrough, Erik O.; Rubin, Jared; Sheremeta, Roman M.; … - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 112 (2015) C, pp. 33-45

Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263909

Can Groups Solve the Problem of Overbidding in Contests?

Sheremeta, Roman M.; Zhang, Jingjing - Department of Economics, McMaster University - 2009

This paper reports an experiment that examines whether groups can make better decisions than individuals in contests …. Our experiment replicates previous findings that individual players significantly overbid relative to theoretical … players. The new findings of our experiment are that groups make bids that are 25% lower, bids have less variance, and there …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528454

A Laboratory Study of a Multi-Level Trust Game with Communication

Sheremeta, Roman M.; Zhang, Jingjing - Department of Economics, McMaster University - 2009

This experimental study explores how communication influences efficiency, trust and trustworthiness in a small group when one member is left out of communication. To study this problem, we introduce a novel three-player trust game where player 1 can send any portion of his endowment to player 2....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528460

Resource allocation contests: Experimental evidence

Shupp, Robert; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Schmidt, David; … - In: Journal of Economic Psychology 39 (2013) C, pp. 257-267

potentially divisible resource. We design an experiment to compare individuals’ decisions across three resource allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010730010