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Incentivizing quantity and quality of output : an experimental investigation of the quantity-quality trade-off
Rubin, Jared; Samek, Anya Savikhin; Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011486193
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Loss aversion and the quantity-quality tradeoff
Rubin, Jared; Samek, Anya Savikhin; Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011758909
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The impact of taxes and wasteful government spending on giving
Sheremeta, Roman M.; Uler, Neslihan - 2020
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012419113
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Behavior in all-pay auctions with ties
Gelder, Alan; Kovenock, Daniel J.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011406845
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Status and the demand for visible goods : experimental evidence on conspicuous consumption
Clingingsmith, David; Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011406857
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Conflicted Emotions Following Trust-based Interaction
Schniter, Eric; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy W. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013
We investigated whether 20 emotional states, reported by 170 participants after participating in a Trust game, were experienced in a patterned way predicted by the “Recalibrational Model” or Valence Models. According to the Recalibrational Model, new information about trust-based interaction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817391
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Do Liars Believe? Beliefs and Other-Regarding Preferences in Sender-Receiver Games
Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012
subject's own behavior in the other role. The results of the experiment indicate that 60 percent of senders adopt deceptive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817438
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Do liars believe? Beliefs and other-regarding preferences in sender–receiver games
Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy W. - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 94 (2013) C, pp. 268-277
subject's own behavior in the other role. The results of the experiment indicate that, when acting as senders, the majority of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719252
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Testing Canonical Tournament Theory: On the Impact of Risk, Social Preferences and Utility Structure
Sheremeta, Roman M.; Wu, Steven Y. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012
We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009646321
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Testing canonical tournament theory: On the impact of risk, social preferences and utility structure
Sheremeta, Roman M.; Wu, Steven Y. - 2012
We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282234