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Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: Theory and Experimental Results.
Sheremeta, Roman M.; Masters, William A.; Cason, Timothy N. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012
competition: winner-take-all contests won by the best performer, winner-take-all lotteries where probability of success is … proportional to performance, and proportional-prize contests in which rewards are shared in proportion to performance. We introduce …-take-all contests. The lottery contests have the same Nash equilibrium as proportional prizes, but induce contestants to choose higher …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817416
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Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments
Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013
We provide an overview of experimental literature on contests and point out the two main phenomena observed in most …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817423
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Asymmetric and Endogenous Communication in Competition between Groups
Cason, Timothy N.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Zhang, Jingjing - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2015
competitive coordination games, such as rent-seeking contests, better within-group coordination leads to more aggressive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145376
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Side-payments and the costs of conflict
Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - In: International Journal of Industrial Organization 31 (2013) 3, pp. 278-286
Conflict and competition often impose costs on both winners and losers, and conflicting parties may prefer to resolve a dispute before it occurs. The equilibrium of a conflict game with side-payments predicts that with binding offers, proposers make and responders accept side-payments,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010666054
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Why Can’t We Be Friends? Entitlements, bargaining, and conflict.
Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012
We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a two-stage bargaining and conflict game with side-payments. In this game, residents (Proposers) make side-payment offers and contestants (Responders) decide whether to accept the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817376
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Commitment Problems in Conflict Resolution.
Kimbrough, Erik O.; Rubin, Jared; Sheremeta, Roman M.; … - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2013
Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817424
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Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict.
Kimbrough, Erik O.; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012
Conflict and competition often impose costs on both winners and losers, and conflicting parties may prefer to resolve the dispute before it occurs. The equilibrium of a conflict game with side-payments predicts that with binding offers, proposers make and responders accept side-payments,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009647549
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Commitment problems in conflict resolution
Kimbrough, Erik O.; Rubin, Jared; Sheremeta, Roman M.; … - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 112 (2015) C, pp. 33-45
Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263909
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An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games
Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kovenock, Dan; Sheremeta, Roman M. - Abteilung "Marktprozesse und Steuerung", … - 2009
This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009367897
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Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests
Chowdhury, Subhasish Modak; Sheremeta, Roman M. - School of Economics, University of East Anglia - 2010
We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests and show that … asymmetric equilibria may arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We also identify contests in the literature where …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642290