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Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests : Theory and Experimental Results
Cason, Timothy N. - 2018
from each contest in a laboratory experiment. Equilibrium and observed efforts are highest in winner-take-all contests …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012940281
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Entry into Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests : An Experimental Study
Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2011
This experiment compares the performance of two contest designs: a standard winner-take-all tournament with a single …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130476
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Principal-Agent Settings with Random Shocks
Rubin, Jared - 2012
Using a gift exchange experiment, we show that the ability of reciprocity to overcome incentive problems inherent in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100248
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Do Liars Believe? Beliefs and Other-Regarding Preferences in Sender-Receiver Games
Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy - Economic Science Institute (ESI), Argyros School of … - 2012
subject's own behavior in the other role. The results of the experiment indicate that 60 percent of senders adopt deceptive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817438
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Do liars believe? Beliefs and other-regarding preferences in sender–receiver games
Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy W. - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 94 (2013) C, pp. 268-277
subject's own behavior in the other role. The results of the experiment indicate that, when acting as senders, the majority of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719252
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Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants : an experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Szech, Nora - 2016
in an experiment. Our data show that indeed, strengthening weaker contestants through tie-breaks and bid …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011472073
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Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants : an experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Szech, Nora - 2016
in an experiment. Our data show that indeed, strengthening weaker contestants through tie-breaks and bid …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473683
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Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants : an experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Szech, Nora - 2016
in an experiment. Our data show that indeed, strengthening weaker contestants through tie-breaks and bid …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473887
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Designing contests between heterogeneous contestants : an experimental study of tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions
Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Szech, Nora - 2016
in an experiment. Our data show that indeed, strengthening weaker contestants through tie-breaks and bid …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011489403
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An experimental investigation of colonel blotto games
Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kovenock, Daniel J.; … - 2009
This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003854423