This paper examines the effect of ownership structure on collateral requirements using the sample of China's listed firms from 2007 to 2009. We find that compared to privately controlled companies, state-controlled companies have lower collateral requirements, and such difference is more...

This paper examines the effect that disproportional ownership has on stock market liquidity using a sample of Chinese listed firms. We find that the controlling shareholders' excess control rights are negatively associated with market liquidity. We also provide evidence to show that the negative...

In this paper we examine the effect of excess control rights on the leverage decisions of Chinese non-SOEs before and after the reforms of non-tradable shares. We identify that both inter-corporate loans and related party transactions are channels through which controlling shareholders...

This paper investigates the impact of ownership and ownership concentration on the performance of China's listed firms. By recognizing the differences between ownership and ownership concentration, and between total ownership concentration and tradable ownership concentration, we find that...

This paper provides a parallel investigation on the impact of board composition, board activity and ownership concentration on the performance of listed Chinese firms. We find that independent directors enhance firm performance effectively than other board factors. The frequency of shareholder...

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders have a positive effect on the pay-performance relationship, while a divergence between control rights and cash flow...

This paper examines the effect of state control and ownership structure on leverage decision of firms listed in Chinese stock market. Our results show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have higher leverage ratios than non-SOEs, and SOEs in regions with a poorer institutional environment have...

This paper examines the effect of excess control rights on the leverage decisions made by Chinese non-SOEs before and after the Non-tradable share reform (NTS reform). We find that firms with excess control rights have more excess leverage and their controlling shareholders use the resources for...

This paper examines how the institutional features of emerging economies (i.e., government ownership, political connections, and market reform) influence CEO pay-dispersion incentives. Consistent with our expectation, we find that CEO pay dispersion generally provides a tournament incentive in...