This discussion paper resulted in a publication in <A HREF="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S019126151300043X">'Transportation Research Part B: Methodological'</A>, 2013, 53, 31-44. We analyse the behaviour of market participants in a multi-modal commuter network where roads are not priced, but public transport has a usage fee, which is set while taking the...</a>

We analyse the behaviour of market participants in a multi-modal commuter network where roads are not priced, but public transport has a usage fee, which is set while taking the effects on the roads into account. In particular, we analyse the difference between markets with a monopolistic public...

We analyse the behaviour of market participants in a multi-modal commuter network where roads are not priced, but public transport has a usage fee, which is set while taking the effects on the roads into account. In particular, we analyse the difference between markets with a monopolistic public...

We study road supply by competing firms between a single origin and destination. In previous studies, firms simultaneously set their tolls and capacities while taking the actions of the others as given in a Nash fashion. Then, under some widely used technical assumptions, firms set a...

Mohring and Harwitz (1962) showed that, under certain conditions, an optimally designed and priced road would generate user toll revenues just sufficient to cover its capital costs. Several scholars subsequently explored the robustness of that finding. This paper briefly summarizes further...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in <I>Transportation Research Part B: Methodological</I> (2011). Vol. 45(10), pages 1545-1559.<P> This paper analyses the cost of access travel time variability for air travelers. Reliable access to airports is important since it is likely that the cost of...</p></i>

Various contributions to the recent literature on congestion pricing have demonstrated that when services at a congestible facility are provided by operators with market power, the case in point often being a few airlines jointly using a congested airport, optimal congestion pricing rules...

We analyse congestion pricing in a road and rail network with heterogeneous users. On the road there is bottleneck congestion. In the train there is crowding congestion. We separately analyse "proportional heterogeneity" that varies the values of time and schedule delay scalarly in fixed...

The recent literature on congestion pricing with large agents contains a remarkable inconsistency: though agents are large enough to recognize self-imposed congestion and exert market power over prices, they do not take into account the impact of their own actions on the magnitude of congestion...