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An economic analysis of consumer class actions in regulated industries

Vogelsang, Ingo; Ramphal, Nishal; Carroll, Stephen J.; … - In: Journal of regulatory economics 32 (2007) 1, pp. 87-104

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003490137

A decentralized method for utility regulation : a further comment

Finsinger, Jörg; Vogelsang, Ingo - 1980

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000164116

Price cap regulation of telecommunications services : a long-run approach

Vogelsang, Ingo - 1988

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000774289

[Rezension von: Laffont, J.-J., ..., A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation]

Vogelsang, Ingo - In: Journal of economics 59 (1994) 3, pp. 335-339

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001346504

Optimal price regulation for natural and legal monopolies

Vogelsang, Ingo - In: Economía mexicana 8 (1999) 1, pp. 5-43

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001374860

Toward improved and practical incentive regulation

Brown, Lorenzo - In: Journal of regulatory economics 3 (1991) 4, pp. 323-338

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001116415

Two-part tariffs as regulatory constraints

Vogelsang, Ingo - In: Journal of public economics 39 (1989) 1, pp. 45-66

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001071095

A little paradox in the design of regulatory mechanisms

Vogelsang, Ingo - In: International economic review 29 (1988) 3, pp. 467-476

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001054783

Path dependencies versus efficiencies in regulation : evidence from "old" and "new" broadband markets in the EU

Briglauer, Wolfgang; Camarda, Enrico Maria; Vogelsang, Ingo - In: Telecommunications policy : the international journal … 43 (2019) 8, pp. 1-17

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012201315

A simple regulatory incentive mechanism applied to electricity transmission pricing and investment

Hesamzadeh, Mohammad Reza; Rosellón, Juan; Gabriel, … - 2017

The informationally simple approach to incentive regulation applies mechanisms that translate the regulator’s objective function into the firm’s profit-maximizing objective. These mechanisms come in two forms, one based on subsidies/taxes,the other based on constraints/ price caps. In spite...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011746784