In this paper, we fully characterize the Nash Equilibrium in the winner-take-all Bertrand Game, showing that a mixed strategy profile is a Nash Equilibrium, if and only if it is a zero operating profit one, and there exist at least two players whose bids are all unprofitable. Compared with...

We generalize Klumpp, Konrad and Solomon's model (KKS Model) to multi-contestant sequential Colonel Blotto Games with prize functions where any contestant's prizes only depend on this contestant's own number of winning rounds. We show that with weakly monotonic prize functions and CSFs...

We consider a large class of 2-contestant Colonel Blotto games, for which the budget and valuation are both asymmetric between players and the contest success functions are in Tullock form with battle-specific discriminatory power in (0, 1] and battle-and-contestant-specific lobbying...

We generalize Klumpp, Konrad and Solomon’s model (KKS Model) to multi-contestant sequential Colonel Blotto Games with prize functions where any contestant’s prizes only depend on this contestant’s own number of winning rounds. We show that with weakly monotonic prize functions and CSFs...

We consider a large class of 2-contestant Colonel Blotto games, for which the budget and valuation are both asymmetric between players and the contest success functions are in Tullock form with battle-specific discriminatory power in (0, 1] and battle-and-contestant-specific lobbying...