We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations onactual work effort of employees with hourly wages. Work effort neither reacts to anincrease of the own wage, nor to a positive or negative peer comparison. This resultseems at odds with numerous laboratory...

Based on an experimental analysis of a simple monetary economy we argue that a monetary system is more stable than one would expect from individual rationality. Weshow that positive reciprocity stabilizes the monetary system, provided everyparticipant considers accepting money as a reasonable...

This paper contributes to the micro-foundation of money in centralizedmarkets with idiosyncratic uncertainty. It shows existence of stationarymonetary equilibria and ensures that there is an optimum quantity ofmoney. The rational solution of our model is compared with actual be-havior in a...

We explain excess volatility, short-term momentum and long-term reversal of asset prices by a repeated game version of Keynes beauty contest. In every period the players can either place a buy or sell order on the asset market. The actual price movement is determined by average market orders and...

Few micro…nance-funded businesses grow beyond subsistence entrepreneur-ship. This paper considers one possible explanation: that the structure ofexisting micro…nance contracts may discourage risky but high-expected returninvestments. To explore this possibility, I develop a theory that uni…es...

This article examines the nature of human behavior in a nested socialdilemma referred to as the Spillover Game. Players are divided into twogroups with positive production interdependencies. Based on theoreticallyderived opportunistic, local, and global optima, our experimental...

E-nstructions facilitates the use of electronic instructions in computerized laboratory ex-periments in social sciences. In this article I provide a set of guidelines for the installationand the use of E-nstructions.

Charness et al. (2007b) have shown that group membership has a strong effect on individualdecisions in strategic games when group membership is salient through payoff commonality.In this comment I show that their findings also apply to non-strategic decisions, even when nooutgroup exists, and I...

We investigate experimentally whether entry costs have an impact on the evolutionof cooperation in a social dilemma game. In particular, subjects repeatedly playthe so-called takeover game with anonymous partners randomly drawn from a fixedpopulation of participants. The game represents a social...