The Maschler-Perles solution is the unique bargaining solution which is superadditive and satisfies the usual covariance properties. We provide two proofs for superadditivity that do not rely on the standard traveling time.

A cephoid is an algebraic ("Minkowski") sum of finitely many prisms in R^n. A cephoidal game is an NTU game the feasible sets of which are cephoids. We provide a version of the Shapley NTU value for such games based on the bargaining solution of Maschler-Perles.

We characterize convex vNM-Stable Sets according to von Neumann and Morgenstern for orthogonal linear production games with a continuum of players.The results of Rosenmüller & Shitovitz [International journal of game theory 29 (2000), pp. 39-61] are thereby substantially improved....