The optimal crop revenue insurance contract is designed from recent developments in the theory of insurance economics under incomplete markets. The message is two-fold. Firstly, when the indemnity schedule is contingent onindividual price and individual yield, the optimal contract depends only...

When a new technology consists of sequences of innovations that culminate in a finalconsumer product, the balance between successive innovators is one of the main concernsin the design of the patent system. While intertemporal aspects of incentive are critical inthis environment of sequential...

Three years after the controversial change of the British market design from compulsory Pool with capacity payments to decentralised energy-only New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) market framework, we compare the two designs in terms of investment incentives. We review the biases of the...

The traditional measure of market power is the HHI, which gives implausible results given the low elasticity of demand in electricity spot markets, unless it is adapted to take account of contracting. In its place the Residual Supply Index has been proposed as a more suitable index to measure...