Water management provides a critical lens onto the development process. For the last several centuries, improvements in clean water and sanitation have contributed to better health and increased life expectancies. Currently, however, developing countries seem unable to make much progress in...

Choice experiments typically include a status quo option, which often describes the current scenario. This is to secure the validity and applicability of choice experiments. People have a propensity to choose what they are familiar with, despite being presented with alternatives that seem better...

In this report, we outline a method for approximating a Markovian (or feedback-Nash) equilibrium of a dynamic game, possibly subject to coupled-constraints. We treat such a game as a "multiple" optimal control problem. A method for approximating a solution to a given optimal control problem via...

In this report, we outline a method for approximating a Markovian (or feedback-Nash) equilibrium of a dynamic game, possibly subject to coupled-constraints. We treat such a game as a "multiple" optimal control problem. A method for approximating a solution to a given optimal control problem via...

Where nations depend on resources originating outside their borders, such as river water, some believe that the resulting international tensions may lead to conflict. Homer-Dixon (1999) and Toset et al. (2000) argue such conflict is most likely between riparian neighbours, with a militarily...

Trust is indispensable to fiduciary fields (e.g., credit rating), where experts exercise wide discretion on others behalf. Can the shame from scandal sort trustworthy people out of a fiduciary field? I tested for the possibility in a charitable contribution game where subjects could be...

Trust is indispensable to fiduciary fields (e.g., credit rating), where experts exercise wide discretion on behalf of others. Can the shame from a scandal sort trustworthy people out of a fiduciary field? I tested for the possibility that a shame externality can sort in a charitable contribution...

We investigate the effect of intragroup competition and risky marginal per capita returns on subjects' cooperative behavior in a one-shot public good game – following the wellknown approach proposed by Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) and extending the Colasante et al. (2019) and...

Using a simple two-group model of the private provision of public goods, this paper investigates how endogenous formation of within-group cooperation is affected by different types and degrees of between-group interactions. We show that when between-group interactions are of the same directions...

Decisions on joint funding of continuous public goods between two agents often involve heterogeneous targets. We introduce loss functions in a contribution game in order to study the effect of this conflict. Unlike Varian (1994), joint contribution occurs only if the players’ targets are...