This paper studies experimentally how firms choose between using a centralized market and bilateral negotiations to recruit new personnel. In the market firms interact with several workers but do not have information about workers’ behavior in the past. In the bilateral negotiations firms...

We study experimentally how entry into a market with uncertain capacity is affected by the type of information potential entrants have available. Our focus is on behavior in a two-market entry game. In the risky information market there are two possible market capacities, both known to occur...

An individual choosing a health insurance policy faces a complex decision environment where a large set of alternatives differ on a variety of dimensions. There is uncertainty and the choice is repeated at least once a year. We study decisions and decision strategies in a laboratory experiment...

We experimentally investigate how the managerial decision making process affects choices in a Bertrand pricing game with an opportunity to form non-binding cartels. To do so we compare the effects of three decision-making rules for the firm (decisions by CEOs, majority rule and consensus) to...

We use a laboratory experiment to compare the way groups and individuals behave in an inter-temporal common pool dilemma. The experimental design distinguishes between a non-strategic problem where players (individuals or groups of three) make decisions without interaction and a strategic part...

How should economic output be distributed among those who created it? An expansive theoretical and empirical literature seeks to answer this fundamental, and controversial, question, which has implications, inter alia, for the structure of wages, redistributive policies and international...

[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling be a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms...