Information asymmetries seem to play an important role in monetary economics. We consider three forms of information transmission which can be used to alleviate these information asymmetries. First, if information is verifiable or the publication of information is in the central bank's interest,...

This paper discusses the relationship between premia for macroeconomic risk in banking, aggregate behavior, and banking crises. We consider a competitive banking system embedded in an overlapping generation model subject to repeated macroeconomic shocks. We highlight how risk premia decline when...

This paper studies the question to what extent premia for macroeconomic risks in banking are sufficient to avoid banking crises. We investigate a competitive banking system embedded in an overlapping generation model subject to repeated macroeconomic shocks. We show that even if banks fully...

We explore the impact of sophistication in risk management as required by Basel II on banking stability and market conditions. We compare a competitive banking system in which only average ratings are available with a competitive system in which banks are able to assess the default risk of...

We investigate the question of whether sophistication in risk management fosters banking stability. We compare a simple banking system in which an average rating is used with a sophisticated banking system in which banks are able to assess the default risk of entrepreneurs individually. Both...

This paper provides a macroeconomic perspective for government interventions in banking crises. We illustrate how vulnerabilities of the banking sector may build up over time and thus destabilize a banking system. A crisis occurs when a large number of banks fail to meet capital requirements or...