Employer learning model predicts the impact of schooling, an observable signal, on wages decreases with accumulation of experience. Workers, however, have incentives to invest in general human capital both at schools and workplaces such that experience and schooling are complements unless the...

Schooling, an observable signal, decreases its impact on wages as employers “publicly” learn workers’ hidden types over workers’ experience in the market. This symmetric employer learning hypothesis has been empirically contested by, first, asymmetry of incumbent and entrant employers,...

Schooling, an observable signal, decreases its impact on wages as employers “publicly” learn workers’ true types from workers’ experience in the market. This symmetric employer learning hypothesis has been empirically questioned as, first, current and potential employers in fact...

The impact of schooling, an observable signal, on wages decreases as the employers “publicly” learn about the workers’ ability from their experience. This symmetric employer learning hypothesis is empirically questioned by, first, the asymmetry in learning of the current and the potential...

The impact of schooling on wages decreases as employers learn about workers’ abilities from their experience. While this employer learning often proceeds asymmetrically between incumbent and entrant employers, large firms’ internal labor markets could satisfy the statistical assumption of...