The purpose of this paper is to present a theoretical framework of the factors that potentially influence dissatisfied customers to continue purchasing from their existing service provider in the business-to-business (B2B) services sector. This review paper synthesises the findings from previous...

This research investigates inertia in a financial services context, with particular focus on the reasons for consumers’ dissatisfaction and inert behaviour, and studies the customers’ complaining behaviours and past and future inertia. The study utilised a two part methodology, including...

Purpose - To investigate the determinants of behavioural brand loyalty amongst dissatisfied customers in the business-to-business (B2B) services sector. Design/methodology/approach - A qualitative study was conducted, with 28 personal interviews undertaken with managers who are involved in the...

Switching costs has been recognised as a primary reason why dissatisfied customers stay with their suppliers. While a validated multidimensional scale of switching costs exists in a business-to-consumer context, there has been little empirical research effort devoted to operationalising...

This paper presents a research model to explore the (i) direct effects of independent variables (interpersonal relationship and attractiveness of alternatives) on behavioural loyalty, (ii) the mediating effects of dependence and calculative commitment on the relationship between independent...

There have been few studies that investigate the reasons that dissatisfied customers stay with service organisations. Further, there have been no studies that have investigated a range of factors simultaneously in a single model in the business services sector. This paper attempts to address...

We analyze the desirability of level playing fields in international financial regulation. In general, level playing fields impose the standards of the weakest regulator upon the best-regulated economies. However, they may be desirable when capital is mobile because they counter a cherry-picking...

We analyze a general equilibrium model in which there is both adverse selection of, and moral hazard by, banks. The regulator can screen banks prior to giving them a licence, audit them ex post to learn the success probability of their projects, and impose capital adequacy requirements. Capital...

The 2007–2009 financial crisis saw a vast expansion in deposit insurance guarantees around the world and yet our understanding of the design and consequences of deposit insurance schemes is in its infancy. We provide a new rationale for the provision of deposit insurance. In our model the...

This paper examines common regulation as cause of interbank contagion. Studies based on the correlation of bank assets and the extent of interbank lending may underestimate the likelihood of contagion because they do not incorporate the fact that banks have a common regulator. In our model, the...