This paper studies the impact of corruption on inward foreign direct investment using a unique firm-level data set. It examines two effects of corruption simultaneously: a reduction in the volume of foreign investment and a shift in the ownership structure. Corruption makes local bureaucracy...

Many countries aim to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) by offering ever more generous incentive packages and justifying their actions with the expected knowledge externalities to be generated by foreign affiliates. Despite being hugely important to public policy, there is little...

This paper examines the preferences of a foreign firm and awelfare-maximizing host country government over two modes of foreigndirect investment (FDI): de novo entry by the foreign firm andacquisition of the domestic incumbent. Two crucial features of the modelare the presence of network...

We develop an equilibrium theory of trade agreements in which both the degree and the nature (bilateral or multilateral) of trade liberalization are endogenously determined. To determine whether and how bilateralism matters, we also analyze a scenario where countries pursue trade liberalization...

This paper compares stable Nash equilibria of two games of trade liberalization. In the FTA game, each country can form an FTA with either one of its trade partners, or both of them, or none of them. By contrast, in the No FTA game, each country must choose either no agreement or free trade....

In a three country model with endogenous tariffs, this paper evaluates and contrasts the welfare effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs) — the two most commonly occurring preferential trade agreements (PTAs). We show that if the external tariff of a PTA is not too...

In a game of endogenous trade agreements, we examine whether the pursuit of free trade agreements (FTAs) affects the prospects of global free trade differently than the pursuit of customs unions (CUs). Our analysis is driven by a fundamental difference between these two types of preferential...

Preferential trade agreement (PTA) members have to eliminate internal tariffs with each other but are allowed to discriminate against non-members. This can be in potential conflict with the WTO's overall non-discrimination clause. Using a competing exporters model of endogenous trade agreement...

This paper constructs a three-country partial equilibrium model to examine the effects of the most favored nation (MFN) clause on equilibrium tariffs and welfare when exporting countries are asymmetric with respect to market structure as well as production costs. In the model, firms sell...

This paper theoretically and empirically analyzes the effect of strengthening intellectual property rights in developing countries on the level and composition of industrial development. We develop a North-South product cycle model in which Northern innovation, Southern imitation, and FDI are...