The present studies investigated the effects of target context on judge sensitivity to target felt rapport. The results suggest that judge sensitivity may be increased by: (a) positioning the target to the judge's left so that the judgment task may benefit from the specialization of the right...

The present studies investigated the effects of dyadic context on judgments of nonverbal behavior associated with rapport. As predicted, the task performed by a dyad, the visible presence or absence of both dyad members, and the sex of the observer affected observer judgments of responsiveness,...

The present studies investigated the effects of target context on judge sensitivity to target felt rapport. The results suggest that judge sensitivity may be increased by: (a) positioning the target to the judge’s left so that the judgment task may benefit from the specialization of the right...

Chapter 1: Nonparametric Identification of Insurance Models with Multidimensional Screening (with Isabelle Perrigne and Quang Vuong)This chapter studies the identification of an insurance model with multidimensional screening, where insurees are characterized by risk and risk aversion. The model...

This thesis consists of two essays. In the first essay, we analyze a two-stage game, with coalition formation in the first stage and Cournot oligopoly in the second, to show how coalition formation takes place and affects the environmental level.In open membership games with symmetric players,...

CHAPTER 1: Informational Control and Organizational DesignThis essay focuses on organizational issues of allocating authority between an uninformed principal and an informed expert. We show that the established result of Dessein (2002) that delegating decisions to a perfectly informed expert is...

Auctions are among the oldest economic institutions in place---they have been used since antiquity to sell a wide variety of goods, and their basic form has remained unchanged. In this dissertation, I explore the efficiency of common auctions when values are interdependent---the value to a...

This dissertation examines a natural signaling mechanism in a two-sided matching market between firms and workers. We consider a basic game of incomplete information. Each agent knows her own preferences over matches, but uncertain about other agent preferences. Each worker can send a limited...