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We empirically assess the winner’s curse effect in auctions for toll road concessions. First, we investigate the overall winner’s curse effects on bidding behaviour. Second, we account for differing levels of common-value components. Third, we investigate whether the possibility of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015218038
For over 10 years the European Community has strived to develop suitable and proportionate answers to the phenomenon of convergence in its audiovisual regulatory policy. This article outlines the regulatory process at an EU level since the early 1980s as far as media, telecommunications and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015229609
The EU regulatory framework for e-communications was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in 2002, and became applicable from 2003. It has three primary objectives: (1) to promote competition; (2) to develop the single market; and (3) to promote citizens' rights. The European...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015229935
In the spectrum sections of its "Proposed Changes" to the Review of the European Union Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, the European Commission establishes a coherent, comprehensive and original set of forward-looking spectrum policy principles. By...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015229945
The EU regulatory framework for electronic communications services distinguishes between markets that are susceptible to ex ante regulation and those that are subject to competition law alone. The paper lays out the methodology for identifying relevant markets that may be considered for ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015229952
We empirically assess the winner’s curse effect in auctions for toll road concessions. First, we investigate the overall winner’s curse effects on bidding behaviour. Second, we account for differing levels of common-value components. Third, we investigate whether the possibility of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015231558
In this article we analyze the remuneration mechanism for the reduction of energy losses, through a dynamic principal-agent model in continuous time. The agent represents the power distribution company, which makes investments, or in other words, makes an effort to reduce energy losses. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015256866
In this article we analyze the remuneration mechanism for the reduction of energy losses, through a dynamic principal-agent model in continuous time. The agent represents the power distribution company, which makes investments, or in other words, makes an effort to reduce energy losses. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015259034
In this paper, we study how a monopolistic firm with unknown costs may behave under the threat of regulation. To this aim, we integrate the self-regulation model of Glazer and McMillan (1992) with the optimal regulatory mechanism devised by Baron and Myerson (1982) for the case of asymmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015260561
When penalties for first-time offenders are restricted, it is typically optimal for the lawmaker to overdeter repeat offenders. First-time offenders are then deterred not only by the (restricted) fine for a first offense, but also by the prospect of a large fine for a subsequent offense. Now...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015262505