This paper presents a model on the leverage of financial intermediaries, where debt are held by risk averse agents and equity by the risk neutral. The paper shows that in an unregulated competitive market, financial intermediaries choose to be leveraged over the social best level. This is...

In this paper we incorporate interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences), and suggest a framework for analyzing and improvement of governance of socio-economics dynamic of agriculture....

In this paper we incorporate interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences), and suggest a framework for analyzing and improvement of governance of socio-economics dynamic of agriculture....

This paper studies a competitive general equilibrium model with default and endogenous collateral constraints. Even though all collateralized contracts are allowed, the possibility and desirability of trade in spot markets (or the equivalent trade in ex ante asset backed securities) creates...

Central to market fundamentals are three ideas: (1) Nominal money (2) Dividend (3) Existing stock. In connection with the cumulative dividend stream criterion of fundamental and noise movement, the conception of sequentially stable Markov process is grounded on the theory of bubbles. This paper...

Perfect risk sharing is not an optimal design for financial system because it can increase systemic risk by facilitating risk contagion among financial institutions. However, risk sharing dominates betting according to most Pareto efficiency criteria. One reason for this might be that those...

Perfect risk sharing is not an optimal design for the financial system because it can increase systemic risk by facilitating risk contagion among financial institutions. However, risk sharing dominates betting according to most Pareto efficiency criteria. One reason for this might be that those...

Perfect risk sharing is not an optimal design for the financial system because it can increase systemic risk by facilitating risk contagion among financial institutions. However, risk sharing dominates betting according to most Pareto efficiency criteria. One reason for this might be that those...

Incomplete markets provide many challenges for both investment decisions and valuationproblems. While both problems have received extensive attention in complete markets,there remain many open areas in the theory of incomplete markets. We present the resultsin three parts. In the first essay we...