We present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their preferred outcome of a vote …. When there is a zero cost to voting, all voters vote and hence all values are counted equally regardless of how high they … may be. By having a cost to voting, only those with high enough values would choose to incur this cost. Hence, the outcome …

of two mechanisms for deciding between them: majority voting and shouting. In majority voting, the choice with the most … find that it is optimal to use voting in the case where n is large and value for each particular alternative of the voters …

Costless pre-play communication has been found to effectively facilitate coordination and enhance efficiency in games … experimental findings from public goods and other coordination games, where communication always enhances efficiency and often …

We present a costly voting model in which each voter has a private valuation for their preferred outcome of a vote …. When there is a zero cost to voting, all voters vote and hence all values are counted equally regardless of how high they … may be. By having a cost to voting, only those with high enough values would choose to incur this cost. Hence, the outcome …

This paper aims at presenting a new voting function which is obtained in Balinski-Laraki's framework and benefits mean …, neutrality, anonymity, monotonicity, and Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives. It also generalizes approval voting …