This paper shows an estimate of the fiscal capacity of the municipalities in Mexico from two alternatives: a Macrofórmula based on the local GDP per capita (for 1.954 municipalities) and our approximation (for 1.461 municipalities) for a Representative Revenue System (RRS), Which is obtained...

Recent attempts of "regionalizing" the VAT, in order to expand fiscal autonomy margins attributed to Regions and to involve them in the hard struggle against tax evasion, strongly urge some considerations on some of the changes introduced in the Italian legal system by the 2001 constitutional...

In this paper we analyze the evolution and current situation of the Mexican Fiscal Federalism. Our diagnosis showed that deep structural inequalities in the country is present, both internally and in comparison with the countries of the OECD. We pointed out the low financial autonomy of the...

The aim of this paper is to determine to what extent and how federal taxes affect local tax decisions. Testing the impact of an increase in the federal tax on horizontal tax competition with Canada-US data for 1984--1994, we find evidence that an increase in federal tax affects horizontal tax...

This study examines whether municipal mergers reduce public expenditure by examining the marginal treatment effect (MTE) of municipal mergers. Extant papers in the literature have paid little attention to bias from self-selection among municipal mergers or to heterogeneity in the treatment...

The second generation fiscal federalism (SGFF) approach is used as a reference to analyze the political and fiscal institutional design of Bolivia’s decentralization model and its evolution. Subnational public finance data up to 2008 is used to verify that decentralization of expenditure was...

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we analyze the Inter-territorial Compensation Fund (ICF) as a regional policy instrument contemplated in the 1978 Spanish Constitution. Attention is focused on the period 1990-2013. Both the drivers of the ICF and its impact on regional public investment...

We develop a model with two provinces, producing two goods: one mobile and the other not. The mobile good is taxed according to the destination principle by the local government; it is also federally taxed. People decide to buy the good at the most advantageous price. Namely they can buy...

The paper’s aim is to link two different issues: equalization and fiscal competition. In the model there are two regions: the first one has rich citizens and the other one has poor citizens. Regional representatives in a federal Council must decide on the introduction of an equalization...