Funding a response to climate change after Kyoto will require another look at both burden sharing and funding mechanisms. After reviewing the risks of cap-and-trade with carbon offsets and the advantages of a harmonized carbon tax, a method is proposed to utilize a harmonized carbon price to...

Israel’s policies regarding Lebanon have been dependent on public opinion, which is very volatile. The citizens of Israel did not favor the occupation of the security zone in South Lebanon because of the Four Mothers movement, and it influenced the government to withdraw military forces...

The vector space model facilitates a very useful representation of the strategic interaction in trade because it is possible to incorporate both symmetric and asymmetric features of the players. This paper characterizes the Nash solution of the non-cooperative international trade game in the...

Conflict between Pakistan and India can be best understood in a multivariate framework where variables such as economic performance, multilateral trade with the rest of the world, bilateral trade, military expenditure, democracy scores and population are simultaneously taken into account. Our...

Economic sanction has been widely used and increasingly a popular tool in maintaining peace and political stability in the world. The use of economic sanction, as opposed to the use of military power, to punish target countries have been supported by the Charter of United Nations (UN). Tsebelis...

We show that a cooperative outcome—one that is at least next-best for the players—is not a Nash equilibrium (NE) in 19 of the 57 2 x 2 strict ordinal conflict games (33%), including Prisoners’ Dilemma and Chicken. Auspiciously, in 16 of these games (84%), cooperative outcomes are nonmyopic...

Where nations depend on resources originating outside their borders, such as river water, some believe that the resulting international tensions may lead to conflict. Homer-Dixon (1999) and Toset et al. (2000) argue such conflict is most likely between riparian neighbours, with a militarily...

This paper offers a solution to The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development, and a universal theory of value. We introduce axioms which serve as the first of two derivations of our solution, our methods, the origin and evolution of our theory, field notes from Mustique, Iceland, and Prince...

We analyze the design of international environmental agreement (IEA) by a three-stage coalition formation game. In stage one, a designer chooses an IEA rule which, depending on the coalition of signatories formed in stage two, specifies the action that each signatory should take in stage three....

We analyze the design of optimal international environmental agreement (IEA) by a three-stage coalition formation game. A certain degree of participation uncertainty exists in that each country choosing to sign the IEA for its best interest has a probability to make a mistake and end up a...