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Sheremeta, Roman - 2018

Costly competitions between economic agents are modeled as contests. Researchers use laboratory experiments to study contests and test comparative static predictions of contest theory. Commonly, researchers find that participants’ efforts are significantly higher than predicted by the standard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015261758

A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments

Dechenaux, Emmanuel; Kovenock, Dan; Sheremeta, Roman - 2014

Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly efforts while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015244890

Behavior in Group Contests: A Review of Experimental Research

Sheremeta, Roman - 2015

Group contests are ubiquitous. Some examples include warfare between countries, competition between political parties, team-incentives within firms, group sports, and rent-seeking. In order to succeed, members of the same group have incentives to cooperate with each other by expending individual...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015249569

The Pros and Cons of Workplace Tournaments

Sheremeta, Roman - 2016

Tournaments are commonly used in the workplace to determine promotion, assign bonuses, and motivate personal development. Tournament-based contracts can be very effective in eliciting high effort, often outperforming other compensation contracts, but they can also have negative consequences for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015253742

Leadership with Individual Rewards and Punishments: Do Incentives Reinforce Leading by Example?

Gürerk, Özgür; Lauer, Thomas; Scheuermann, Martin - 2015

Leading by example is considered as an important means to influence followers and to increase team performance. In most organizations, however, leading by example does not come alone. To influence followers, leaders simultaneously use a variety of instruments. Most frequently, leaders possess...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015256830

Leadership with Individual Rewards and Punishments

Gürerk, Özgür; Lauer, Thomas; Scheuermann, Martin - 2015

Leading by example is considered an important means to influence followers. In most organizations, however, to influence followers, leaders use a variety of instruments. Most frequently, leaders possess the power to administer rewards or punishments to team members. Do individual rewards or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015259735

Leadership with Individual Rewards and Punishments: Do Incentives Reinforce Leading by Example?

Gürerk, Özgür; Lauer, Thomas; Scheuermann, Martin - 2015

Leading by example and the provision of incentives are considered as two important means to influence teammates’ behavior and increase team cooperation. How do these two aspects of leadership interact with each other? Do incentives reinforce leading by example, or do they even weaken its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015253362

Trial-Based Tournament: Rank and Earnings

Pongou, Roland; Tchantcho, Bertrand; Tedjeugang, Narcisse - 2015

Trial-based tournament is a widespread hiring mechanism in organizations. Upon a job opening, an applicant is tried out at the job, then swaps with another competing applicant, and so on, with each non-competing worker holding the same position across trials. The job is offered to the applicant...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015248348

Agent-based computational economics and African modeling:perspectives and challenges

Nwaobi, Godwin - 2011

In recent years, the government, of African Countries has assumed major responsibilities for economic reforms and growth. In attempting to describe their economies, economists (policymakers) in many African Countries have applied certain models that are by now widely known: Linear programming...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015229769

Social risk and ambiguity in the trust game

Fairley, Kim; Sanfey, Alan; Vyrastekova, Jana; Weitzel, Utz - 2012

control to a human source of risk while lottery risk has a mechanistic source. We propose a risky trust game that … the classic trust game are indeed best explained by social risk preferences and not by lottery risk preferences with an … objectively known probabilities of trustworthiness, trust also has an ambiguous component. We therefore decompose uncertainty in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015234419