We study political distortions that emerge in situations where agents’ political power is disproportionate with respect to their economic power. We use the Shapley value to evaluate both the economic and the political power. We show that usual weighted majority voting cannot prevent political...

Firms sign an integration contract with the purpose of increasing their expected profits from trade and competition with third parties. Gains depend on how the contract improves the partners' production function (e.g. better synergies, organization, etc.), and how it increases their power in the...

We present novel evidence on the nexus between alcohol intake and trust at a large cultural gathering event. Throughout six editions, we interviewed nearly 2,000 attendees and collected an objective measure of alcohol intake (Blood Alcohol Concentration, BAC) using electronic breathalyzers and...

In this paper, we report data drawn from a field study in an Italian region (Campania), where a disastrous earthquake took place in 1980. We rely on subjects’ responses to a questionnaire and on experimental measures. We compare the time preferences in two different samples, the first one...

Experimental evidence suggests that agents in social dilemmas have belief-dependent, other-regarding preferences. But in experimental games such preferences cannot be common knowledge, because subjects play with anonymous co-players. We address this issue theoretically and experimentally in the...