This dissertation studies equilibrium matching patterns in the marriage and labor markets when agents have heterogeneous preferences over partner's traits. Economic analysis of matching has previously focused largely on equilibria obtained when agents have homogeneous preferences. While this...

We build a satisficing model of probabilistic choice under risk which embeds Expected Utility Theory (EUT) into a boundedly rational deliberation process. The decision maker accumulates evidence for and against alternative options by repeatedly sampling from her underlying set of EU preferences...

Effective integrated water management is a key component of the World Water Vision and the way in which aspirations for water equity may be realized. Part of the vision includes the promotion of sustainability of water systems and full accountability for their interaction with other urban...

The approach to water management worldwide is currently in transition, with a shift evident from purely centralised infrastructure to greater consideration of decentralised technologies, such as rainwater harvesting (RWH). Initiated by recognition of drivers including increasing water demand and...

Lab evidence on trust games involves more cooperation than conventional economic theory predicts. We explore whether this pattern extends to a field setting where (much like in a lab) we are able to control for (lack of) repeat-play and reputation: cab drivers in Mexico City. We find a...

Lab evidence on trust games involves more cooperation than conventional economic theory predicts. We explore whether this pattern extends to a field setting where we are able to control for (lack of) repeat-play and reputation: the taxi market in Mexico City. We find a remarkably high degree of...

We develop, and experimentally test, models of informal agreements. Agents are assumed to be honest but suffer costs of overcoming temptations. We extend two classical bargaining solutions -- split-the-difference and deal-me-out -- to this informal agreement setting. For each solution there are...