Is there a division among n players of a cake using n-1 parallel vertical cuts, or of a pie using n radial cuts, that is envy-free (each player thinks he or she receives a largest piece and so does not envy another player) and undominated (there is no other allocation as good for all players and...

We investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities by facing a union bargaining process. For the case of a unionized mixed duopoly, only public firm is able to choose a type of contract based on the degree of...

By introducing the government's preference for tax revenues into the theoretical framework of unionized mixed oligopolies, this study investigates the efficiency of privatization. The results show that (i) regardless of the government's preference for tax revenues, its incentive to privatize a...

The Article presents a brief survey of economic history, by emphasizing the earlier history of neo-classical economic theory and the economic theory of marginal utility. The Articles does so for exploring the relation of game theory or the strategic game to developments in the field or science...

The Article presents a brief survey of economic history, by emphasizing the earlier history of neo-classical economic theory and the economic theory of marginal utility. The Articles does so for exploring the relation of game theory or the strategic game to developments in the field or science...

The Article presents a brief survey of economic history, by emphasizing the earlier history of neo-classical economic theory and the economic theory of marginal utility. The Articles does so, by exploring the relation of game theory or the strategic game to developments in the field or science...

By introducing the government's preference for tax revenues into an extended game with observable delay, this study provides new insight into the trade-off between the government and the public firm's payoff in a government's optimal policy of privatization. The results show that: (i) regardless...

We propose two variations of the non-cooperative bargaining model for games in coalitional form, introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a). These strategic games implement, in the limit, two new NTU-values: The random marginal and the random removal values. The main characteristic of these...

Motivated by a case of discrimination against some particular players happened in the real world, we define the partially consistent property of the solutions for cooperative games and use the property to characterize the Shapley value. This is different from the characterization of the Shapley...

We defined the potential for multi-choice cooperative games, and found the relationship between the potential and the multi-choice Shapley value. Moreover, we show that the multi-choice Shapley is consistent.