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We put forward an optimal bidding mechanism for a bundle of power transmission infrastructure works. Specifically, the regulator auctions two works altogether: one is to be developed and operated by the winning bidder, while the other is an owner-operated and financed expansion of an existing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015213417
We empirically assess the winner’s curse effect in auctions for toll road concessions. First, we investigate the overall winner’s curse effects on bidding behaviour. Second, we account for differing levels of common-value components. Third, we investigate whether the possibility of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015218038
This paper models a contest where several sellers compete for a contract with a single buyer. There are several styles of possible designs with a subset of them preferred by the buyer. We examine what happens when the buyer communicates information about his preferences. If the sellers are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015219109
We provide a comparison of bidding behavior between multi-round and single-round auctions considering bid lettings for asphalt construction contracts. Using a reduced-form difference-in-difference approach as well as the nonparametric estimation technique proposed by Racine and Li (2004) we find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015224680
We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to participate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015227682
We empirically assess the winner’s curse effect in auctions for toll road concessions. First, we investigate the overall winner’s curse effects on bidding behaviour. Second, we account for differing levels of common-value components. Third, we investigate whether the possibility of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015231558
In public procurement auctions, governments routinely offer preferences to qualified firms in the form of bid discounts. Previous studies on bid discounts do not account for affiliation -- a form of cost dependence between bidders that is likely to occur in a public procurement setting....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015257250
In public procurement auctions, governments routinely offer preferences to qualified firms in the form of bid discounts. Previous studies on bid discounting do not account for affiliation – a form of cost dependence between bidders that is likely to occur in a public procurement environment....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015260008
In government procurement auctions of construction contracts, entrants are typically less informed and bid more aggressively than incumbent firms. This bidding behavior makes them more susceptible to losses a¤ecting their prospect of survival. In April of 2000, the Oklahoma Department of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015240187
As a selling mechanism, auctions have acquired a central position in the free market economy all over the globe. This development has deepened, broadened, and expanded the theory of auctions in new directions. This chapter is intended as a selective update of some of the developments and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015241751