Licensing can be a solution for hold-up in patent thickets. In this paper we study whether licensing is an effective solution for hold-up. To do this we distinguish between ex ante and ex post licensing. A theoretical model shows that firms’ expectations of blocking in a patent thicket...

Previous studies on the measurement of learning-by-doing emphasize the importance of accounting for multi-vintage effects having an impact on firms’ production costs through economies of scope. This study shows that accounting for cannibalization effects on the demand side is equally important...

In dieser Studie analysieren wir die Interaktionen zwischen Multiproduktwettbewerb und drei Aspekten von Innovation: Research Joint Ventures mit asymmetrischen Unternehmen, Neue Produkteinführung, und Innovation mit Multiproduktunternehmen. Wir untersuchen Mechanismen und Effekte, die einen...

This dissertation comprises of 3 essays that analyze the firm pricing behavior in duopolistic experimental markets. The first essay examines whether the content of buyer information and the timing of its dissemination affect firms' market power. We construct laboratory markets based on a costly...

This study provides a unified framework to compare three canonical types of contests: winner-take-all contests won by the best performer, winner-take-all lotteries where probability of success is proportional to performance, and proportional-prize contests in which rewards are shared in...

This experiment compares the performance of two contest designs: a standard winner-take-all tournament with a single fixed prize, and a novel proportional-payment design in which that same prize is divided among contestants by their share of total achievement. We find that proportional prizes...

Motivated by problems of coordination failure observed in weak-link games, we experimentally investigate behavioral spillovers for minimum- and median-effort coordination games. Subjects play these coordination games simultaneously and sequentially. The results show that successful coordination...

Costless pre-play communication has been found to effectively facilitate coordination and enhance efficiency in games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. We report an experiment in which two groups compete in a weakest-link contest by expending costly efforts. Allowing intra-group communication leads...

This note introduces a model of contests with random noise and a shared prize that combines features of Tullock (1980) and Lazear and Rosen (1981). Similar to results in Lazear and Rosen, as the level of noise decreases the equilibrium effort rises. As the noise variance approaches zero, the...

Within-group communication in competitive coordination games has been shown to increase competition between groups and lower efficiency. This study further explores potentially harmful effects of communication, by addressing the questions of (i) asymmetric communication and (ii) the endogenous...