Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to financial risk. We show that by using a coherent measure of risk it is impossible to...

In this paper cost sharing problems are considered. We focus on problems given by rooted trees, we call these problems cost-tree problems, and on the induced transferable utility cooperative games, called irrigation games. A formal notion of irrigation games is introduced, and the...

Ordinary type spaces (Heifetz and Samet, 1998) are essential ingredients of incomplete information games. With ordinary type spaces one can grab the notions of beliefs, belief hierarchies and common prior etc. However, ordinary type spaces cannot handle the notions of finite belief hierarchy and...

The notion of common prior is well-understood and widely-used in the incomplete information games literature. For ordinary type spaces the common prior is defined. Pinter and Udvari (2011) introduce the notion of generalized type space. Generalized type spaces are models for various bonded...

Ely and Peski (2006) and Friedenberg and Meier (2010) provide examples when changing the type space behind a game, taking a "bigger" type space, induces changes of Bayesian Nash Equilibria, in other words, the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is not invariant under type morphisms. In this paper we...

The notion of common prior is well-understood and widely-used in the incomplete information games literature. For ordinary type spaces the common prior is defined. Pinter and Udvari (2011) introduce the notion of generalized type space. Generalized type spaces are models for various bonded...

The notion of common prior is well-understood and widely-used in the incomplete information games literature. For ordinary type spaces the common prior is defined. Pinter and Udvari (2011) introduce the notion of generalized type space. Generalized type spaces are models for various bonded...

Taking advantage of ambiguity in strategic situations is well documented in the literature. However, so far there are only few results on how to make ambiguous strategies. In this paper we introduce a procedure which makes objective ambiguity, concretely it draws an element from a set of priors,...

We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players and the core understood in the space of bounded additive set functions. We show that, if a game is bounded below, then its core is non-empty if and only if the game is balanced. This finding generalizes Schmeidler...

We consider transferable utility cooperative games with infinitely many players. In particular, we generalize the notions of core and balancedness, and also the Bondareva–Shapley Theorem for infinite TU games with and without restricted cooperation, to the cases where the core consists of...