The equivalence of markets and games concerns the relationship between two sorts of structures that appear … fundamentally different -- markets and games. Shapley and Shubik (1969) demonstrates that: (1) games derived from markets with … concave utility functions generate totally balanced games where the players in the game are the participants in the economy …

outside players play their best response noncooperatively, the core is nonempty in games with strategic complements. We apply …This paper proposes a formulation of coalitional payoff possibilities in games with externalities, based on the … this result to Cournot and Bertrand games and to public goods economies. …

members of deviating coalitions move �first in choosing a coordinated strategy. We accordingly defi�ne what we call the phi-core …, and characterize the phi-core allocations of a cartel formation game and of a public goods economy. …

This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium … and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show that CCE exist for all symmetric supermodular games. Furthermore, we … discuss the existence of a CCE in specific submodular games employed in the literature on environmental agreements. …

This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium … and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show that CCE exist for all symmetric supermodular games. Furthermore, we … discuss the existence of a CCE in specific submodular games employed in the literature on environmental agreements. …

Shapley value (Shapley 1953b) in cooperative games. As shown in Besner (2017a), the proportional Shapley value is a convincing … enable similar properties for cooperative games with a level structure, we generalize this value. Therefore we adapt the …