To overcome incompatibility issues, kidney patients may swap their donors. In international kidney exchange programmes (IKEPs), countries merge their national patient–donor pools. We consider a recently introduced credit system. In each round, countries are given an initial “fair”...

We allocate objects to agents as exemplified primarily by school choice. Welfare judgments of the objectallocating agency are encoded as edge weights in the acceptability graph. The welfare of an allocation is the sum of its edge weights. We introduce the constrained welfare-maximizing solution,...

In kidney exchange programmes patients with end-stage renal failure may exchange their willing, but incompatible living donors among each other. National kidney exchange programmes are in operation in ten European countries, and some of them have already conducted international exchanges through...

Jelen esszé betekintést kíván nyújtani a nem szorosan ezzel foglalkozó olvasó számára a 2020. évi közgazdasági Nobel-díjasok, Paul Robert Milgrom és Robert Butler Wilson szakterületébe, az aukcióelméletbe. Ahhoz, hogy megértsük, milyen megfontolásokból és milyen céllal...

Admission to universities is organised in a centralised scheme in Hungary. In this paper we investigate two major specialities of this application: ties and common quotas. A tie occur when some students have the same score at a programme. If not enough seats are available for the last tied group...

The complex multi-criteria optimisation problems arising in Kidney Exchange Programmes have received considerable attention both in practice and in the scientific literature. Whereas theoretical advancements are well reviewed and synthesised, this is not the case for practice. We present a...

We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents’ preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty: (1) lottery model—for each agent, there is a probability distribution over linear...

In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences the stability of the solution is typically the most important requirement. However, we may also face some distributional constraints with regard to the minimum number of assignees or the distribution of the assignees...