We present a new concept for (generalized) strategic form games, called \emph{doubly strong equilibrium}, and give an existence result when the players have non-ordered and discontinuous preferences. Since a doubly strong equilibrium is a strong equilibrium in the sense of Aumann, we get the...

This paper studies the efficiency of competitive equilibria in environments with a moral hazard problem and unobserved states, both with retrading in ex post spot markets. The interaction between private information problems and the possibility of retrade creates an externality, unless...

The work of Friedrich Von Hayek contains several testable predictions about the nature of market processes. Vernon Smith termed the most important one the ‘Hayek hypothesis’: equilibrium prices and the gains from trade can be achieved in the presence of diffuse, decentralized information,...

The work of Friedrich Von Hayek contains several testable predictions about the nature of market processes. Vernon Smith termed the most important one the ‘Hayek hypothesis’: the gains from trade can be realized in the presence of diffuse, decentralized information, and in the absence of...

The maximal domain theorem by Gul and Stacchetti (J. Econ. Theory 87 (1999), 95-124) implies that for markets with indivisible objects and sufficiently many agents, the set of gross substitutable preferences is a largest set for which the existence of a competitive equilibrium is guaranteed, and...

Welfare maximisation is constrained by the ultimate frontier of efficient allocations, with a unique, interior optimum. By the second welfare theorem, such an optimum depends on a specific wealth distribution out of innumerable ones at given prices, whereby the state cannot refrain from...

Welfare maximisation is constrained by the ultimate frontier of efficient allocations, with a unique, interior optimum. By the second welfare theorem, such an optimum depends on a specific wealth distribution out of innumerable ones at given prices, whereby the state cannot refrain from...

After the micro politics, the complexity of the “public management”, polity and policies, is the same of the “private management” or the management of the others sectors of the social production reality. The science of management it is not defined by products, functions, sectors and so...

None of the known macroeconomic theories are adequate to understand what to do in a global crisis like the 2020 Global Pandemic. Rational Expectations and monetarism cannot even ex-plain how is that a global crisis like this happens. The IS-LM model was designed to manage business cycles, but...