This study examines consumer preferences for organic and local apples by combining between- and within-subject design characteristics in a second price auction. We first ask subjects to bid for 1 Kg of apples without any information. In subsequent rounds we reveal information about the organic...

Previous literature analyzing the effects of incentive compatibility of experimental payment mechanisms is dominated by theory. With overwhelming evidence of theory violations in a multiplicity of domains, we fill this gap by empirically exploring the effects of different payment mechanisms in...

We examine whether the way individuals randomize between options captures their decision confidence. In two experiments in which subjects faced pairs of options (a lottery and a varying sure payment), we allowed subjects to choose randomization probabilities according to which they would receive...

Regulators of artificial intelligence (AI) emphasize the importance of human autonomy and oversight in AI-assisted decision-making (European Commission, Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, 2021; 117th Congress, 2022). Predictions are the foundation of all AI...

Standard random utility models can account for stochastic choice. However, a common implication is that the realized utilities are equal with probability zero. This knife-edge aspect implies that indifference is thin because arbitrarily small changes in utility will break indifference....

There is a substantial literature examining coordination in public goods games. We conducted an experiment to explore how varying patterns of thresholds affect the willingness of subjects to contribute to a public good. We had subjects play a multi-period game where each subject was allocated an...

In a standard auction, bidders bid more aggressively when the number of bidders increases. However, Krishna and Rosenthal (1996, Games and Economic Behavior) show that when bidders have multiple-unit demand that generates positive synergies, bidders bid less aggressively as the number of bidders...