We introduce the notion of an antichain-convex set to extend Debreu (1954)'s version of the second welfare theorem to economies where either the aggregate production set or preference relations are not convex. We show that (possibly after some redistribution of individuals' wealth) the Pareto...

This paper examines the conditions for the existence of a maximal element of a relation on every nonempty compact subset of its ground set. A preliminary analysis establishes some connections between the maximals of a relation and those of its right trace. Via this analysis, various results of...

We prove the existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in nice games with isotone chain-concave best replies and compact strategy sets. We establish a preliminary fixpoint uniqueness argument showing sufficient assumptions on the best replies of a nice game that guarantee the...

We prove the existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in nice games with isotone chain-concave best replies and compact strategy sets. We establish a preliminary fixpoint uniqueness argument showing sufficient assumptions on the best replies of a nice game that guarantee the...

We prove the existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in nice games with isotone chain-concave best replies and compact strategy sets. We establish a preliminary fixpoint uniqueness argument, thus showing sufficient assumptions on the best replies of a nice game that guarantee the...

In a pioneering approach towards the explanation of the phenomenon of "yes man" behavior in organizations, Prendergast (1993) argued that incentive contracts in employment relationships generally make a worker distort his privately acquired information. This would imply that there is a trade-off...

Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson (1990) have conjectured that exclusive use of negligence liability leads to suboptimal choice of precaution in the presence of uncertainty and that ex ante regulation can correct these inefficiencies. We complete their argument by making a mild additional premise.

This paper provides a non-technical discussion of the incomplete contracting approach to the theory of the firm developed by Grossman and Hart (1986). This approach offers an answer to the questions regarding the boundaries of the firm first raised by Coase (1937).

The theory of contracts is one of the most active research areas in economics. While classic contract theory failed to account for institutions such as property rights and authority, the theory of incomplete contracts has overcome these conceptual problems and produced a variety of interesting...

In this paper we discuss "lock in effects" and "hold-up problems" (which occur when relationship-specific investments are sunk).