Acyclicity of individual preferences is a minimal assumption in social choice theory. We replace that assumption by the direct assumption that preferences have maximal elements on a fixed agenda. We show that the core of a simple game is nonempty for all profiles of such preferences if and only...

The paper discusses opportunities to utilize the series of micro-blogs as provided by the Twitter in observation of opinion dynamics. The spontaneity of tweets is more, as the service is attached more to the mobile communications. The extraction of information in the series of tweets is...

In a scenario with a continuum of asymmetrically informed agents, we analyze how the initial information of a trader may be altered when she becomes a member of a coalition. In contrast to a perfect competition frame, we first show that neither arbitrarily small coalitions nor large coalitions...

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that dynamic paths in a model of discrete choice with social interactions, which have been developed by Brock and Durlauf (1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2006), converge some self-consistent equilibrium. To this aim, we propose an asynchronous model of...

This paper revisits the aggregation theorem of Chichilnisky (1980), replacing the original smooth topology by the closed convergence topology and responding to several comments (N. Baigent (1984, 1985, 1987, 1989), N. Baigent and P. Huang (1990) and M. LeBreton and J. Uriarte (1900 a, b)....

The theory of social choice introduced in [5,6] is robust; it is completely independent of the choice of topology on spaces of preference. This theory has been fruitful in linking diverse forms of resource allocation; it has been shown [17] that contractibility is necessary and sufficient for...

Acyclicity of individual preferences is a minimal assumption in social choice theory. We replace that assumption by the direct assumption that preferences have maximal elements on a fixed agenda. We show that the core of a simple game is nonempty for all profiles of such preferences if and only...

In this paper, we introduce the weak and the strong notions of partially honest agents (Dutta and Sen, 2012), and then study implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) in pure exchange economies with three or more agents in which pure-consequentialistically...

We consider economic obstacles that limit the reliability and accuracy of value-at-risk (VaR). Investors who manage large market transactions should take into account the impact of the randomness of large trade volumes on predictions of price probability and VaR assessments. We introduce...