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On Salesforce Compensation with Inventory Considerations

Rodriguez, Fabrizio - 2023

This study critically examines Dai and Jerath's (2013) influential paper on incentive schemes in inventory management, revealing a substantial flaw: an equilibrium fails to exist for a broad set of parameters allowed by the paper. Illustrated through a specific example, we identify fundamental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015271192

Market-based incentives

Grochulski, Borys; Zhang, Yuzhe - 2013

We study optimal incentives in a principal-agent problem in which the agent's outside option is determined endogenously in a competitive labor market. In equilibrium, strong performance increases the agent's market value. When this value becomes sufficiently high, the threat of the agent's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015236444

Individual versus Team Production with Social Preferences

Banerjee, Swapnendu; Chakraborty, Somenath - 2022

This paper examines the impact of social preferences on the choice between individual production and team production. An inequity-averse principal can hire a single or a team of two agents to work on a single project. The agents are inequity-averse with respect to the principal. In this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015213490

"Endogenous" Relative Concerns: The Impact of Workers' Characteristics on Status and Pro ts in the Firm

Ramalingam, Abhijit - 2009

This paper explores the rationality of status concerns amongst co-workers and the impact of such rational status concerns on a firm's profits. We find that it is individually rational for agents in a firm to develop and exhibit status concerns. Workers are, by their choices of status concerns,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015219142

Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality

Ohlendorf, Susanne; Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2011

We consider a repeated moral hazard problem, where both the principal and the wealth-constrained agent are risk-neutral. In each of two periods, the agent can exert unobservable effort, leading to success or failure. Incentives provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015225618

Multi-Tasking vs. Screening: A Model of Academic Tenure

Kou, Zonglai; Zhou, Min - 2009

"incentivize" teaching activity is decreasing the incentive power to researching activity. This justifies the low-powered contract … to tenured professors. However, with low-powered contract, the university will face serious informational problem in the … from the potential occupational vacancy if the wage level is low. To this dilemma, the up-or-out contract is a possible …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015218492

The dynamics of working hours and wages under implicit contracts

Guerrazzi, Marco; Giribone, Pier Giuseppe - 2019

and firms have agreed upon an implicit contract that smooths long-run consumption. Specifically, we analyse a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015265120

Efficiency wage (and slavery) efficiency: in theory and in time

Saccal, Alessandro - 2021

The formal differentiation of (i) pain incentives from ordinary rewards, (ii) of effortful from careful production and (iii) of diligent from slothful workers under labour market imperfect competition ultimately suggests that the optimal menu of contracts associates inducements to production...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015250270

How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms

Pham, Hien - 2023

threshold disclosure is (approximately) optimal. While information design expands the scope for random mechanisms to outperform …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015213256

How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms

Pham, Hien - 2023

threshold disclosure is (approximately) optimal. While information design expands the scope for random mechanisms to outperform …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015213486