This paper considers the stability of tacit collusion in price setting duopolies with repeated interaction. The minimum discount factor above which tacit collusion can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium is called the critical discount factor delta*. In addition, delta* is often used...

Different information provision in experimental markets can drastically change subjects' behavior. Considering the repeated Bertrand duopoly game of Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), we find that population feedback about the prices in other markets outside a subjects' own current market causes...

This paper studies how the request for a favor has to be devised in order to maximize its chance of success. We present results from a mini-dictator game in which giving entails an efficiency gain. In this laboratory experiment, the recipient can send a free-form text message to the dictator...

This paper studies how the request for a favor has to be devised in order to maximize its chance of success. We present results from a mini-dictator game laboratory experiment in which giving entails an efficiency gain. Before the dictator decides, the recipient can send a free-form text message...

Die Arbeit basiert auf fünf Aufsätzen. In diesen wird über vier Experimentserien berichtet, die das individuelle Entscheidungsverhalten von Versuchspersonen in ähnlichen, aber verschieden komplexen Situationen erheben. Es wird ein experimentelles Szenario vorgestellt, mit dessen Hilfe...

In der betriebswirtschaftlichen Realität werden riskante Entscheidungen meistens nach vorherigen Gewinn- oder Verlusterfahrungen getroffen und empirische Beobachtungen legen nahe, dass vorherige derartige Erfahrungen das aktuelle Risikoverhalten beeinflussen. Da dieser Umstand in den...