We investigate incentive effects of a typical hedge-fund contract for a manager with power utility. With a one-year horizon, she displays risk-taking that varies ramatically with fund value. We extend the model to multiple yearly evaluation periods and find her risk-taking is rapidly moderated...

We investigate incentive effects of a typical hedge-fund contract for a manager with power utility. With a one-year horizon, she displays risk-taking that varies dramatically with fund value. We extend the model to multiple yearly evaluation periods and find her risk-taking is rapidly moderated...

Numerous hedge funds stop reporting to commercial databases each year. An issue for hedgefund performance estimation is: what delisting return to attribute to such funds? This would be particularly problematic if delisting returns are typically very different from continuing funds’ returns. In...

We model a firm’s value process controlled by a manager maximizing expected utility from restricted shares and employee stock options. The manager also dynamically controls allocation of his outside wealth. We explore interactions between those controls as he partially hedges his exposure to...

Incomplete markets provide many challenges for both investment decisions and valuationproblems. While both problems have received extensive attention in complete markets,there remain many open areas in the theory of incomplete markets. We present the resultsin three parts. In the first essay we...