The objective of this paper is to develop an analytical framework for estimation of the parameters of a structural model of an incentive contract under moral hazard, taking into account agents heterogeneity in preferences. We show that allowing the principal to strategically distribute the...

We present a methodology allowing to introduce manufacturers and retailers vertical contracting in their pricing strategies on a differentiated product market. We consider in particular two types of non linear pricing relationships, one where resale price maintenance is used with two part...

A tanulmány bevezetője a vállalati hálózatok történetével foglalkozva felteszi a kérdést: vajon abban az országban, amely múltját tekintve erősen központosított, a vége felé közeledik-e a jelenleg mindenható államhatalom? A szerzők úgy gondolják, hogy nem: a francia...

We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the market for experts. The information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preference for the status quo. We show that it is optimal to publicly disclose...

In this paper, we develop a model of a decision maker using an expert to obtain information. The expert is biased toward some favoured decision but cares also about its reputation on the market for experts. We then analyse the corresponding decision game depending on the nature of the...