This paper proposes a formulation of coalitional payoff possibilities in games with externalities, based on the assumption that forming coalitions can exploit a ”first mover advantage”. We derive a characteristic function and show that when outside players play their best response...

We reconsider the problem of cartel stability in a linear symmetric Cournot oligopoly by assuming that every coalition of firms defecting from a cartel can choose its quantity before the remaining firms. We show that differently from Salant et al. (1983) the only profitable cartel includes all...

This paper revisits a particular norm of behaviour underlying the well known model of kinked demand. We show that under some standard regularity conditions this norm of behaviour sustains the efficient outcome in all symmetric games.

In a standard portfolio choice between a risky and a safe asset, we study the effect of imposing premia and penalties conditional on the realized return of the portfolio meeting a given threshold. We show that thresholds set at ”intermediate levels” have the effect to increase the optimal...

This paper considers cooperative game theoretic settings in which forming coalitions can act as Stackelberg leaders. We de�fine a value function which modi�fies the gamma-value function (Hart & Kurz, 1983, Chander & Tulkens, 1997) by letting members of deviating coalitions move �first in...

This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show...

This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show...

We model the process of knowledge transmission among firms via workers mobility as a multi-stage game. In our setup an idea to be realized needs that the agent informed about the idea recruits another agent from a pool of uninformed people. This constraint generates a recursive effect of...

This paper analyzes price collusion in a repeated game with two submarkets; a standard and a premium quality segment. Within this setting, we study four types of price-fixing agreement: (i) a segment-wide cartel in the premium submarket only, (ii) a segment-wide cartel in the standard submarket...

This paper explores how social interactions among consumers shape markets. In a two-country model, consumers meet and exchange information about the quality of the goods. As information spreads, the demands evolve, affecting the prices and quantities manufactured by profit-maximizing firms. We...