There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or not to observe the eventual outcome. In these instances, individuals often prefer to avoid observing the outcome. The standard von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) Expected Utility model cannot accommodate these cases, since it...

There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or not to observe the eventual outcome. In these instances, individuals often prefer to avoid observing the outcome. The standard von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) Expected Utility model cannot accommodate these cases, since it...

We build a satisficing model of probabilistic choice under risk which embeds Expected Utility Theory (EUT) into a boundedly rational deliberation process. The decision maker accumulates evidence for and against alternative options by repeatedly sampling from her underlying set of EU preferences...

There are a number of cases in which individuals do not expect to find out which outcome occurs. The standard von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility model cannot be used in these cases, since it does not distinguish between lotteries for which the outcomes are observed by the agent and...

There are many situations in which individuals do not expect to find out which outcome will occur. The standard vNM Expected Utility model is inappropriate in these cases, since it does not distinguish between lotteries for which the outcomes are observed by the agent and lotteries for which...

There are many situations in which individuals do not expect to find out which outcome will occur. The standard vNM Expected Utility model is inappropriate in these cases, since it does not distinguish between lotteries for which the outcomes are observed by the agent and lotteries for which...

Game theoretic modeling involves making assumptions on agents' infinite hierarchies of beliefs. These assumptions are understood to be only approximately satisfied in the actual situation. Thus, the significance of game theoretic predictions depend on robustness properties of the solution...

Game theoretic modeling involves making assumptions on agents' infinite hierarchies of beliefs. These assumptions are understood to be only approximately satisfied in the actual situation. Thus, the significance of game theoretic predictions depend on robustness properties of the solution...

This paper contributes to the research agenda on non-cooperative foundations ofWalrasian Equilibrium. A class of barganing games in which agents bargain over prices and maximum trading con- straints is considered: It is proved that all the Stationary Sub- game Perfect Equilibria of these games...

Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger�s (2004) extends Rabin�s (1993) theory of reciprocity in a dynamic sense, introducing a rule of revision for player�s beliefs. The Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium [SRE] they define can be dynamically inconsistent. In this article it is argued that such...