En este trabajo se determina el problema de la gestión óptima de la deuda pública en una pequeña economía abierta. El Gobierno emite un continuo de bonos de vencimiento finito sujeto a restricciones de liquidez. Hallamos que la solución puede ser descentralizada: la emisión óptima de un...

Credit constraints that link a private agent's debt to market-determined prices embody a systemic credit externality that drives a wedge between competitive and (constrained) socially optimal equilibria, which induces private agents to ``overborrow". We quantify the effects of this externality...

Credit constraints that link a private agent's debt to market-determined prices embody a systemic credit externality that drives a wedge between competitive and (constrained) socially optimal equilibria, which induces private agents to ``overborrow". We quantify the effects of this externality...

Credit constraints that link a private agent's debt to market-determined prices embody a systemic credit externality that drives a wedge between competitive and (constrained) socially optimal equilibria, which induces private agents to ``overborrow". We quantify the effects of this externality...